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ABSTRACT 
Zephyr, a high altitude long endurance (HALE) solar powered, unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) is thus identified as a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) 
candidate. This program is managed by the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and is 
sponsored by United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and United States 
European Command USEUCOM. This program aims to accelerate the development and 
operational evaluation of the Zephyr concept so that the system can transit to production 
and be deployed in the field to address military needs in the quickest possible time.  
The objective of this study is to analyze the Return on Investment (ROI) of the 
Zephyr system. This is achieved by  
• developing a model to carry out a Business Case Analysis (BCA) of 
JCTDs, including defining the methodical structure required in the 
business case report  
• conducting Zephyr JCTD BCA, with a baseline analysis, followed by 
sensitivity, as well as a quality risk assessment for Zephyr system. 
The BCA compares the life cycle costing with that of the Global Observer, a liquid-
hydrogen fuelled UAV, in operational scenarios over a period of 15 years. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Zephyr, a high altitude long endurance (HALE) solar powered, unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) is thus identified as a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) 
candidate. This program is managed by the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and is 
sponsored by United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and United States 
European Command (USEUCOM). This program aims to accelerate the development and 
operational evaluation of the Zephyr concept so that the system can transit to production 
and be deployed in the field to address military needs in the quickest possible time.  
The objective of this study is to analyze the Return on Investment (ROI) of the 
Zephyr system. This is achieved by  
• developing a model to carry out Business Case Analysis (BCA) of JCTDs, 
including defining the methodical structure required in the business case 
report  
• conducting Zephyr JCTD BCA, with a baseline analysis, followed by 
sensitivity, as well as a quality risk assessment for the Zephyr system. 
The BCA compares the life cycle costing with the Global Observer, a liquid-hydrogen 
fuelled UAV, in operational scenarios over a period of 15 years; the results of the 
analyses are as follows: 
• The total Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCE) savings for acquiring and 
operating Zephyr over Global Observer over a 15 year period is estimated to 
be $794M (FY08$), starting from FY 08.   
- The investment savings is $405M (FY08$) or approximately 91% of the 
investment cost for Global Observer. 
- The operating and support savings is $389M (FY08$) or approximately 
77% of the operating and support cost for Global Observer. 
• There is also an estimated potential cost avoidance of $41.8M (FY08$) per 
annum on commercial satellite bandwidth usage in that Zephyr can be 
 xiv
deployed to provide tactical battlefield communications over the area of 
interest, an addition to its ISR mission. 
• The base case annualized compounded ROI over a 15-year period from FY08 
is 22% based on a NPV saving of $793,497K (FY08$). 
• The base case annualized ROI decreases to about 16% when Zephyr aircraft 
AUC increases from 1.8M to 3.5M (FY08$), almost doubling the estimated 
aircraft AUC used in the base case analysis. 
• The base case annualized ROI does change significantly when the CGS cost 
or the payload is varied from 5% to 20% of the aircraft AUC. The ROI 
remains at approximately 22% to 23%.   
• The number of Zephyr systems that can be purchased given the funds required 
to purchase one unit of Global Observer system is ten, at a cost of $2,200K 
(FY08$). This increases to 37 when the unit cost of the Zephyr system is 
reduced to $600K (FY08$) for a 15-year period starting from FY08. 
• The number of Zephyr systems that can be purchased and supported given the 
funds required to purchase and support one unit of Global Observer system is 
six, at a cost of $154,404K (FY08$) for a 15-year period starting from FY08. 
• The number of Zephyr systems that can be acquired and supported given the 
funds required to acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer system 
ranges from four to ten when the aircraft AUC decreases from $1.8M (FY08$) 
to $0.6M (FY08$), with a discount rate increasing from 0% to 20%. 
• The number of Zephyr systems that can be acquired and supported given the 
funds required to acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer system 
remains from four to ten when the aircraft AUC decreases from $1.8M 
(FY08$) to $0.6M (FY08$), with a discount rate increasing from 0% to 20% 
and a GCS or payload cost varies from 5% to 20% of the Zephyr aircraft 
AUC. 
 xv
• The number of Zephyr systems that can be acquired and supported given the 
fund required to acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer system 
ranges from four to eight when the annual O&S cost decreases from $7.7M 
(FY08$) to $4M (FY08$) with a discount rate increasing from 0% to 20%.  
• The reliability of the Zephyr system remains uncertain even though there are 
claims of success in its flight demonstrations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
In modern military operations, the need for continual communication, command, 
and control (C3) and persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) are 
critical for mission success, especially when ground forces are deployed deep in 
inhospitable geographical terrains, where C3 and ISR are a challenge to maintain. Several 
options are available to tackle this problem but they have proved to be economically 
unfeasible. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM have recognized that there is a need for cost 
effective C3 and ISR capabilities to sustain these military operations. 
Zephyr, a high altitude long endurance (HALE), solar powered, unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) has been identified as a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 
(JCTD) candidate. This program is managed by the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
and is sponsored by USCENTCOM and USEUCOM. This program aims to accelerate the 
development and operational evaluation of the Zephyr concept, so that the system can 
transit to production and be deployed in the field to address the military’s needs in the 
quickest possible time.  
The objective of this study is to analyze the Return on Investment (ROI) of 
Zephyr system. This is achieved by  
• developing a model to carry out Business Case Analysis (BCA) of JCTDs, 
including defining the methodical structure required in the business case 
report.  
• conducting Zephyr JCTD BCA, with a baseline analysis, followed by 
sensitivity, as well as a quality risk assessment for the Zephyr system. 
The BCA compares the life cycle costing with the Global Observer, a liquid-hydrogen 




B. WHAT ARE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND 
RECONNAISSANCE AND COMMAND, CONTROL AND 
COMMUNICATION? 
The Department of Defense (DoD) defines intelligence as “information and 
knowledge obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.” [1] 
Surveillance and reconnaissance refer to “the means [by] which the information is 
observed, with surveillance being a systematic observation to collect whatever data that is 
available, while reconnaissance is a specific mission performance to obtain specific data.” 
[2] For this thesis, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance will be used collectively 
to mean everything from observation to collection of data. 
In the modern military era, ISR plays a critical role during wartime or peacetime. 
It helps commanders to know and to understand both the situation and the enemy so that 
they can plan an appropriate course of action to ensure mission success. As Sun Tze, an 
ancient Chinese warrior, wrote, “If you know your enemy and yourself, in hundred 
battles you will never peril.” The effectiveness of ISR also greatly depends on its ability 
stay on-station for an extended period of time, or persistence ISR.  If the ISR is able to 
continuously capture and feed back to the commander all the data it captures, then useful 
and accurate information can be inferred from these data.   
Command, control, and communication refer to the ability of commanders to 
instruct and direct the ground forces by means of effective interaction with them. This is 
typically done using commercial communications satellite bandwidth. This bandwidth 
acts like a “highway” to transmit text data such as email, voice data and image data. If the 
bandwidth is high, then more data is able to flow through the “highway” at a rapid rate, 
which will result in the continuous flow of data to and from a commander. If the 
commander is video conferencing with his ground forces, this would require good picture 
and voice quality without any distortion or lags. Commanders always want high 
bandwidth for their C3 operations but very often are limited to a certain amount of 
bandwidth. One main reason is because of the high cost incurred in obtaining the 
bandwidth, which makes it economically unfeasible to do so for a long period of time. 
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C.  SOLAR POWERED UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE 
Solar power generally refers to the conversion of sunlight into electricity. 
Everyday the sun sends out an enormous amount of energy, of which only a small 
percentage reaches the earth, about 1 part in 2 billion [3]. Nevertheless, this small amount 
of energy is sufficent to supply the United States of America’s energy needs for one and a 
half years. 
The conversion of solar energy to electrical energy is carried out using 
photovoltaic (PV) cells. These PV cells are made of semiconductor materials, such as 
silicon which display photoelectric characteristics when sunlight strikes them, and 
produces electricity. In some cases, an array of PV cells is used to generate electricity 
which is sometimes stored in rechargable batteries and which is then used when there is 
insufficient light or a complete absence of sunlight (e.g. night time) to generate electricity 
for practical uses. This cycle of storing and using electrcity via rechargeable batteries 
ensures a continuous supply of electricity, regardless of day or night time. 
The range of possible applications of solar energy using PV cells is vast, from 
powering a simple calculator to powering a complex vehicle system. Over recent 
decades, this technology has also been integrated into UAVs, so that the flight endurance 
of UAVs is no longer dependent on the quantity of fuel that they can carry onboard, thus 
increasing their flight endurance significantly. Table 1 shows the different solar powered 
UAV systems and their developmental status in 2008/ 2009. Almost all systems are still 
in the “proof of concept/continuing development” stage, which suggests that this 
technology is still in its infancy as regards the UAV industry; serious efforts are still on-
going to ensure that the concept is fundamentally sound in its application to UAVs. 
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Table 1. Solar Powered UAVs and Their Development Status [From 4] 
Producer Country System Status 
Tecknisolar-Seni France  D.E.R.E 
Proof of Concept/ Development 
Continuing 
Tecknisolar-Seni France Libellule 
Proof of Concept/ Development 
Continuing 
Alcatel, Belgium&vito, 
Belgium & Verhaert, 
Belgium and QinetiQ, UK 
International Pregasus 
Proof of Concept/ Development 
Continuing 
Politecnico Tori& Euro 
Consortium 
International Heliplat 




Israel Sun Sailor Proof of Concept 
QinetiQ – Farnborough UK Mercator 
Ordered as test/ demonstration 
system 
AC Propulsion USA So Long 
Proof of Concept/ Development 
Continuing 




Lockheed Martin USA 
High Altitude 
Airship 
Proof of Concept/ Development 
Continuing 




No longer in development 
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D.  PROBLEM STATEMENTS 
As modern warfare becomes more sophisticated, the need to enhance current 
fighting capabilities is highly desirable so as to ensure a winning advantage over the 
enemy. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM have thus identified a need for “rapid, secure 
over-the-horizon command, control and communications and intelligence, surveillance 
and recconaissance capabilities” [5]. Moreover, the deployment of current C3 and ISR 
capabilities is also hindered by its high cost in procurement, as well as its operation and 
support. 
1. High Cost in Global Persistent Surveillance 
Over decades, the outcomes of UAV developmental programs have not met 
expectations. Technical problems such as the inability to integrate sensors, platforms, and 
ground elements have caused project schedules to overrun and inevitably push unit 
production costs to a level far in excess of what U.S. DoD are willing to pay. In an article 
in Defense Industry Daily [6], it was reported that a $143 million contract was awarded to 
Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation to provide for contract price increases and 
funding to account for the long-range Global Hawk UAV’s Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development overruns. This cost overrun was due to design modifications 
in the airframe and wings, and directly caused the unit price of Global Hawk to increase 
to $35 million. 
However, the increase of cost is not the only contributor to high costs in global 
persistence surveillance. The nature of an operation can also add to its cost. In most 
missions today, the need for 24/7/365 surveillance is essential for almost all operations. 
Because UAVs are not able to fly for long periods of time, numerous sorties are required 
to sustain a continuous surveillance operation. This would add to operation and support 
(O&S) costs, which could eventually make a surveillance operation too expensive to 
carry out.    
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2. High Cost and Shortage of Communications Bandwidth 
A robust and uninterrupted communication network between commanders and 
ground forces, as well as between ground forces, is vital in all military operations. This 
ensures that information shared is not ambiguous and that commanders are able to 
improve their situational awareness and make decisive commands instantly. 
Currently, the US DoD leases commercial satellites to provide the necessary 
bandwidth for communications during military operations, but in recent years demand for 
communications bandwidth has increased exponentially. It is estimated that the 
bandwidth used during 2002’s Operation Enduring Freedom, in Afghanistan, was seven 
times greater than the bandwidth used in the 1991 Gulf War; Operation Iraqi Freedom, in 
2003, is estimated to have required bandwidth roughly ten times that of the 1991 Gulf 
War [7]. This increase has resulted in a significant increase in DoD expenditure on leased 
commercial satellite bandwidth. In 2000, the DoD spent $91 million for 1,324 Mhz of 
bandwidth leased; in 2005, the amount spent increased to $330 million for 6,444 Mhz 
leased.  Figure 1 shows the shows the growth in commercial satellite expenditures and 
bandwidth usage from 2000 to 2005: 
Figure 1. Growth in Commercial Satellite Communications Expenditure 
and    Bandwidth Usage [From 8, Fig 2-1] 
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E.  CASE FOR CHANGE — DOING THINGS BETTER 
In order to sustain war superiority against the enemy, the need for ISR and C3 
capabilities is essential. However the implementation of the current ISR and C3 
capabilities is too costly to support the battle adequately and, thus, the need to find a cost 
effective solution is vital.  
Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) is a program managed by 
the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD). Its aim is to accelerate the development and 
operational evaluation of potential technologies that are able to address military needs, so 
that the technologies can transit to production and be deployed in the field in the quickest 
possible time.  
Hence the Zephyr system has been identified as one of the JCTD candidates, 
which aims to alleviate the high cost of persistent surveillance and communications, as 
well as to solve the problem of the shortage of communications bandwidth. 
D.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
To achieve the objectives set out in Section A, the author will 
• develop and recommend an analytic structure for performing business case 
analyses (BCA)   
• conduct a BCA for Zephyr JCTD based on this structure 
• report on the results of Zephyr JCTD BCA 
• formulate the appropriate recommendations to the decision makers. 
The degree of comprehensiveness to which this thesis presents the BCA is limited 
to the data and information made available to the author.  Key assumptions made while 
performing the BCA are as follows: 
• A conservative approach is adopted, i.e., whenever a choice had to made 
between higher and lower costs due to ambiguity in the data, the higher cost is 
used.  
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• Where information is not available, or was not made available to the author, 
estimates are used and reasonable assumptions are made in regards as to how 
they are derived. 
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II. BACKGROUND  
This section provides an overview of the key technologies currently employed for 
global surveillance and communications missions.  It also includes new technologies that 
are being developed in order to alleviate the high cost of global persistent surveillance, as 
well as to address the problem of the existing shortage of bandwidth resources.  A 
summary of the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Program is also 
explained, with details on the history and development of the Global Observer JCTD 
Program.  Finally, the section concludes with an overview of the Business Case Analysis 
(BCA) methodology. 
A. CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES 
Lim [9] identified 3 main types of technologies that are being deployed, or are 
being developed, for surveillance and communications missions. The three main types are 
as follows: 
• fossil-fueled UAVs (flexible deployment, but limited loiter capability) 
• satellites (inflexible deployment, but persistent loiter capability)  
• High Altitude Airships (relatively flexible deployment, with persistent 
loiter capability) 
1. Fossil-fueled UAVs 
UAVs are remotely piloted or self-piloted aircraft that can carry cameras, sensors, 
communications equipment, or other payloads that are able to provide ISR and C3 
capabilities to support combat missions. UAVs are classified into several categories, and 
these are summarized in Table 2: 
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Table 2. UAV Classifications [From 4] 







Nano, () < 1 100 < 1 < 0.025 
Micro, (µ) < 10 250 1 < 5 
Mini, (Mini) < 10 150 – 300 < 2 < 30 
Close Range, (CR) 10 – 30 3,000 2 – 4 150 
Short Range, (SR) 30 – 70 3,000 3 – 6 200 
Medium Range, (MR) 70 – 200 5,000 6 – 10 1,250 
Medium Range Endurance, (MRE)  > 500 8,000 10 – 18 1,250 
Low Altitude Deep Penetration, (LADP) > 250 50 – 9,000 0.5 – 1 350 
Low Altitude Long Endurance, (LALE) > 500 3,000 > 24 < 30 
Medium Altitude Long Endurance, (MALE) > 500 14,000 24 – 48 1,500 
High Altitude Long Endurance, (HALE)  > 2000 20,000 24 – 48 4,500 
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, (UCAV) Approx. 1500 10,000 Approx. 2 10,000 
Lethal, (LETH) 300 4,000 3 – 4 250 
Decoy, (DEC) 0 – 500 5,000 < 4 250 
Stratospheric, (STRATO) > 2000 >20,000 & 
<30,000 
> 4 TBD 
 
The main advantage of deploying UAVs is that they can fulfill the role of manned 
aircraft to carry out missions that are considered “dull,” “dirty,” or “dangerous.” This not 
only saves valuable human resources for other critical missions, but it also eliminates the 
risk of losing human lives during missions.   
However, these missions are limited by the flight endurance of UAVs. Flight 
endurance is highly dependent on the amount of fuel that a UAV can carry. The more fuel 
an aircraft is able to carry, the longer its flight endurance, and as a result, the greater its 
ability to stay on-station. However, no UAV has a maximum flight endurance of greater 
than 48 hours, regardless of the amount of fuel any given it carries; in order to sustain a 
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mission that requires 24/7/365 coverage, numerous aircraft and sorties are required. 
Hence, the cost of deploying a fossil-fueled UAV for 24/7/365 missions is significant. 
2. Satellites  
A satellite is a man-made spacecraft placed into orbit around the earth, and that 
carries electronic devices which transmit signals to Earth and receive signals in return. 
The first satellite, Sputnik 1, was launched on 4 October 1957 by the Soviet Union, which 
ushered in an era of new political, military, technological, and scientific development. Its 
launch also marked the start of the space age and the U.S. – U.S.S.R. “space race” [10]. 
The space race soon spilled over to other countries and over the last three decades, the 
Ukraine, Japan, China, India, and Israel have successfully launched satellites into orbit on 
their own nationally-developed launch vehicles [11]. Many other countries are also 
actively pursuing and developing this area of interest. 
There are many uses for satellite technology that include both military and non-
military applications. The main military uses of satellite technology are for 
communications and ISR purposes. The advantage of using this technology is that it can 
provide 24/7/365 on-station capability for any mission, without concerns about the 
enemy’s ability to detect and shoot down the satellite. However, there is a downside to 
using this technology. The cost of launching a satellite into space is estimated to range 
from $50 million to $400 million per launch. Moreover, satellites, once launched, are 
non-recoverable and mission specific; that is, they cannot be retrieved and re-configured 
to carry out other missions. For example, if a mission requires an ISR capability, the 
satellite will be designed as a spy satellite, with an imagery payload mounted, and 
launched into space. In an event that communications capability is required, the satellite 
cannot be recovered and re-configured to be a communications satellite. Rather, there 
will be a need to launch a communications satellite for this purpose; as a result, the costs 
of employing both ISR and communications capabilities using satellites technology are 
considerable.  
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3. High Altitude Airships 
A high altitude airship is an unmanned, lighter-than-air vehicle that operates 
above the jet stream in a geostationary position; it delivers persistent station keeping as 
surveillance platform, telecommunications relay, or weather observer [12]. It is 
envisioned that this technology will provide a less costly alternative to address gaps in 
ISR and communications applications for the military and commercial world. 
This technology is still in the developmental stage, but investors are optimistic 
about its future. The current forerunner developments in this field are: 
a.   The Composite Hull High Altitude Powered Platform    
      (CHHAPP) [13] 
  CHHAPP is an effort of the United States Army and Missile Defense 
Command program to demonstrate a powered stratospheric airship at high altitude and 
for a long endurance period. The first airship developed under this program was the 
Aerostar International Hisentinel, which was tested in 2005. It reached an altitude of 
74,000 feet and carried a payload of 27 kilograms. The long-term objective for CHHAPP 
is to carry a payload of up to 440 kilograms for as long as a month. The CHHAPP is 
shown in Figure 2. 
















b.   High Altitude Airship 
   The High Altitude Airship (HAA) is being developed by Lockheed Martin 
and is sponsored by the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC). 
The production HAA are expected to flown at a height of 65,000 feet or up to six months 
at a time, carrying a 1800-kilogram radar [12]. The first flight is expected to take off in 
2010.   The HAA is shown in Figure 3. 


















c.   Integrated Sensor Is Structure (ISIS) 
   The ISIS is being developed jointly by Northrop Grumman and Lockheed 
Martin and is sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 
The program aims to develop a stratospheric airship-based autonomous unmanned sensor 
with years of persistence in the surveillance and tracking of air and ground targets [16]. 
This program is different from the other high altitude airship programs in the sense that 
this program focuses on the payload rather than the airship platform. The payload aboard 
ISIS accounts for roughly 30 to 40 percent of its platform weight, whereas the payload 
aboard other airship concepts is significantly smaller.  The ISIS airship is shown in 
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Figure 4. However, with the as-yet uncompleted development and testing of these 
capabilities, any possible operational deployment would still be some years away.  
















B.  JOINT CAPABILITY TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION (JCTD) 
The JCTD program evolved from the Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration (ACTD) Program, which had its inception in 1994 under the sponsorship 
of the Department of Defense (DoD). The program is led by the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense (Advanced Systems and Concepts), DUSD (AS&C), who works with a team 
of ACTD/JCTD oversight executives to interact with the various AS&C divisions to 
harvest capabilities for Combatant Commands. 
1. The ACTD Program 
The objective of the ACTD program is to help DoD acquisition processes adapt to 
present-day economic and threat environments by exploiting mature, advanced 
technologies to develop solutions for critical military problems. Each ACTD program 
focuses specifically on one or more war fighting needs and is carefully reviewed by the 
Services, Defense Agencies and Joint Staff for its suitability. Potential solutions are then 
proposed for initiation in each fiscal year and those with the greatest prospective are 
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submitted to the Joint Staff/Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) for 
prioritization.  
ACTDs are characterized by their employment of mature technologies over a 
fixed period of activity.  In addition, they leverage existing technological investments.  
Finally, ACTDs have a strong focus on joint operations with Combatant Command 
warfighter participation, as well as a significant level of cross-service, cross-
agency/organization involvement.   
The guidelines [18] developed for the selection of ACTD candidates are: 
• The timeframe for completing the evaluation of military utility is typically 2–4 
years. 
• The technology should be sufficiently mature. 
• The project provides a potentially effective response to a priority military 
need. 
• A lead service or agency has been designated. 
• The risks have been identified, understood, and accepted. 
• Demonstrations or exercises have been identified that will provide an 
adequate basis for utility assessment. 
• Funding is sufficient to complete the planned assessment of utility and to 
provide technical support for the first two years of fielding the interim 
capability. 
• The developer is ready to prepare a plan that covers all essential aspects.  
These include affordability, interoperability, sustainability, and evolutionary 
capability, vis-à-vis technology and threat changes. 
The objectives of the ACTD are to conduct meaningful demonstrations of the 
capability, to develop and test concepts of operations to optimize military effectiveness, 
and to prepare to transition the capability into acquisition without loss of momentum, if 
warranted.  An additional goal of the ACTD is to provide a residual capability to further 
refine CONOPS and to permit continued use prior to formal acquisition, as well as to 
provide the ability to proceed into formal acquisition for additional capability, if required. 
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Possible outcomes after the ACTD operational demonstration are: 
• The user sponsor may recommend the acquisition of the technology and field 
the residual capability that remains at the completion of the demonstration 
phase of the ACTD to provide an interim and limited operational capability; 
• The user’s need is fully satisfied by the residual capability remaining at the 
conclusion of the ACTD, and there is no requirement to acquire any additional 
units of the system; 
• The capability is deemed to not demonstrate sufficient military utility, 
resulting in the project being terminated or returned to the technology base. 
2. The JCTD Program 
In FY2006, a new ACTD business process was initiated to update the successful 
ACTD program to meet the DoD’s transformational goal of becoming capability-based, 
rather than threat-based, in its focus.  This program, which was named the Joint 
Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Program, includes many of the positive 
aspects of the ACTD program, as well as improvements to meet new and evolving 
defense challenges.  The process will integrate the ACTD program with the new Joint 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS).   
Current ACTD processes will be transited to the improved JCTD program over a 
3-5 year transition period, with the intent of having the JCTDs replace the ACTDs.  The 
new process will focus on joint and transformational technologies that are initiated in 
Science and Technology (S&T), and carried through the difficult transition stage.  The 
new JCTD business model will also include a Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) pilot 
program that will take a limited number of “joint peculiar” JCTDs past Milestone B, into 
procurement, followed by initial sustainment – a “cradle-to-grave” approach.   
Similar to the ACTD program, the JCTD program possesses three possible 
transition models post-demonstration.  They are: 
• Transition to Program of Record (POR). The military utility of the program 
has been successfully demonstrated, and the concepts will be adopted by the 
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warfighters.  Products will be transferred to a new/current POR or GSA 
(Government Services Administration) schedule.  The acquisition of 
additional capability will also be funded. 
• Interim Capability to Meet Needs of the Warfighter.  Military utility has 
been successfully demonstrated, and the concepts will be adopted by the 
warfighter.  However, the products may or may not have been sent to a POR.  
This interim capability fully meets the warfighter’s needs and is being 
maintained. 
• Return to Technology Base. The military utility is deemed to be not 
successfully demonstrated.  Relevant components or capabilities may be 
incorporated into other systems, returned to the technology base, or 
terminated. 
C. ZEPHYR JCTD 
Zephyr is a solar-powered, HALE UAV concept conceived by QinetiQ Ltd, UK. 
Its aim is to provide an affordable solution to a number of military gaps, particularly in 
the areas of deep reach, surveillance, and communication relay. The Zephyr prototype is 
shown in Figure 5. 









Zephyr is designed to operate for an extended duration of three months during 
which the aircraft would not descend below 50,000 feet altitude. The general design 
parameters of Zephyr are given in Table 3. Zephyr Design Parameter [From 19]The 
system’s long endurance will enable it to perform many tactical roles requiring long loiter 
time over target area, thereby making an important contribution to maintaining battle 
space awareness.  Moreover, due to its relatively small size and the ability to sustain at a 
high altitude during operation, Zephyr will be ensured of its low observability and low 
vulnerability, which is ideal for missions that are considered high risk for other airborne 
platform. 
Table 3. Zephyr Design Parameter [From 19] 
Systems Mass (kg) 
Platform  < 30 
Battery 9 
Payload  2 
Solar Array 3.2 
 
In 2007, Zephyr was selected as a JCTD candidate to address the current 
operation voids for persistence ISR and C3 capabilities. The schedule of the Zephyr 
JCTD program is planned to span over a two-year period, starting from 2008. The 
program is sub-divided into five partially overlapping phases, as follows:   
Phase 1 – Airframe development and validation 
Phase 2 – Operation system requirement and Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)  
preparations 
Phase 3 – LRIP, operational documentation and training 
Phase 4 – Preparations for volume production and military certification 
Phase 5 – Volume production 
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[Refer to Appendix A for the detailed Zephyr JCTD program.]   
Phase 1 of the program was concluded in August 2008 at Yuma Proving Ground, 
Arizona with the demonstration of the aircraft, carrying a communications test payload 
weighing two kilograms, sustaining a flight endurance of 82 hour and 37 minutes [20]. 
D.  BUSINESS CASE ANALYSES 
A Business Case Analysis [21] (BCA) is a fundamental tool used by decision-
makers to evaluate different alternatives and then decide on the best courses of action 
required in the allocation of scarce resources. It is a structural and systematic 
methodology that examines not only the cost, but also other quantifiable and non-
quantifiable factors that support an investment decision. 
The BCA is an iterative process that is conducted and updated as required 
throughout the lifecycle of the program. A typical BCA would include the following 
elements: 
• the objectives of the case  
• the methods, assumptions and constraints   
• possible alternatives, including the current status quo 
• the costs and benefits of each alternative in the scenario 
• sensitivity analysis and risk analysis   
• conclusions and suitable recommendations 
As a decision-making tool, the quality and reliability of the BCA is crucial in 
enabling the decision-maker to make an informed choice. As such, the BCA process 
provides the decision-maker with relevant insights as to how the project supports the 
strategic objectives and how it can achieve them. This assessment is structured such that 
pertinent information on the scope, alternatives, costs, and benefits are laid out clearly, 
with potential risks highlighted so that the decision-maker can decide whether or not to 
invest in the project. 
As no two BCAs are alike in their objectives, assumptions, constraints, risk, and 
operating scenario, it is necessary that each BCA is customized for the particular case 
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given the operating environment, i.e., there is no one-size-fits-all solution.  However, a 
generic BCA methodology can be described as a four-phase process, as shown in Figure 
6. BCA Methodology [From 21]  
Figure 6. BCA Methodology [From 21] 
 
 
The steps in the process are: 
1. Definition 
In the first phase, the scope, assumptions, and constraints will be defined to guide 
the analysis.  Alternative options are also explored to ensure that a minimum of two 
outcomes (one of which could be maintaining the status quo) are available at the end of 
the analysis.   
2. Data Collection 
In the second phase, a data collection plan is devised, so that the types of data 
required, data sources, and how they can be obtained, can be mapped out.  Models must 
also be developed so that the data can be categorized and stored, while preserving its  
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integrity.  Data normalization is also applied where required.  Where the data is not 
available, estimates can be made, as long as they can be justified, and the methodology 
adopted explained clearly. 
3. Evaluation Analysis 
The third phase is where most of the actual BCA work is accomplished.  Data 
analysis is performed to build the case for each alternative.  Alternatives are compared 
against the baseline and with one another to determine the alternative that provides the 
optimal cost-benefit combination.  Risk analysis is performed to identify the set of risks 
associated with each alternative, along with proposed risk-mitigating strategies.  
Sensitivity analysis is also performed to provide insights as to how changes in key 
parameters or underlying assumptions and constraints that were made could influence the 
outcome of the analysis. 
4. Results Presentation 
The fourth and final phase is where the results are communicated to the decision-
maker.  The information presented should be concise, with relevant supporting evidence 
from the previous phases.  A conclusion and recommended course of action should also 
be provided to the decision-maker based on the objectives defined in Phase 1.   
In summary, once completed, the BCA should be able to determine the following: 
• the relative cost vs. benefits of different strategies  
• the methods and rationale used to quantify benefits and costs  
• the impact and value of Performance / Cost / Schedule / Sustainment 
tradeoffs  
• data required to support and justify the strategy  
• sensitivity of the data to change  
• analysis and classification of risks  
• a recommendation and summary of the implementation plan for 
proceeding with the best value alternative 
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III. ZEPHYR BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 
This section details the conduct of a BCA of deploying the Zephyr system, which 
analysis uses the Global Observer, a liquid hydrogen-fueled HALE UAV as a 
comparison. 
The analysis starts by defining the scenario under which the UAVs will be 
deployed with emphasis on 24/7/265 ISR and communications relay missions. The 
available data will be analyzed, followed by the computation of Return on Investment 
(ROI) as well as a sensitivity analysis on the key results obtained. In addition, the ratio of 
the number of Zephyr system equivalence to the number of Global Observer is computed 
to provide us with an insight on the number of Zephyr system equivalent can be 
purchased and sustained over its lifecycles. Finally, a general risk assessment for the 
Zephyr system is made. 
The analysis is modeled closely on the BCA carried out by Lim [9], as 
comparison is made against it. This is to ensure that the BCA conducted on Zephyr has 
the same baseline as that of Global Observer, and is thus unbiased. 
A. OPERATIONAL SCENARIO 
There are six areas of interest for strategic deployment of the systems to provide 
continuous ISR coverage, as well as providing tactical battlefield communication. These 
six regions form the tasking requirements for our analytical scenarios and are 
summarized as follows: 
• Trans-Sahara Region.  To support the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism 
Initiative (TSCI). 
• Afghanistan / Pakistan. To support the on-going military operations in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.   
• Iraq. To support Task Force ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify and Neutralize) 
and on-going peace-support operations in Iraq. 
• Colombia. To support the on-going fight against the illegal flow of drugs into 
CONUS (CONtinental United States). 
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• Strait of Malacca. To maintain surveillance of possible terrorist activities that 
would restrict a ship’s passage across the narrow strait. 
• China / North Korea. To maintain U.S. surveillance of nuclear facilities and 
military defenses in the region. 
1. UAV Operating Bases 
For the purpose of comparison, it is assumed that Zephyr is launched from any 
one of the following three existing or designated-future operating bases, which is aligned 
with the assumed Global Observer operating bases.   
These bases are: 
• Beale Air Force Base (California, USA) – Current Global Hawk Operating 
Base. 
• Anderson Air Force Base (Guam) – New Global Hawk Forward Operating 
Base to be ready in 2009. 
• Al Dhafra Air Base (United Arab Emirates) – Existing Expeditionary Global 
Hawk Forward Operating Base. 
2. Selection of UAV Operating Base  
Table 4 illustrates the distances from the nearest operating base (correct to the 
nearest ten nautical miles) to the various Areas of Operations (AO).  For the purpose of 
distance computation, the following locations were used as proxy for the respective AO: 
• Trans-Sahara Region: Niger-Algeria-Mali boundary 
• Afghanistan / Pakistan: Kabul 
• Iraq: Baghdad 
• Colombia: Bogota 
• Strait of Malacca: Singapore 
• China / North Korea – Pyongyang 
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Table 4.  Selection of Operating Bases to Launch the UAV 
 Area of Operation Nearest UAV  Operating Base Distance (nm) 
1 Trans-Sahara Region Al Dhafra AB 2810 
2 Afghanistan / Pakistan Al Dhafra AB 980 
3 Iraq Al Dhafra AB 760 
4 Colombia Beale AFB 3290 
5 Strait of Malacca Anderson AFB 2540 
6 China / North Korea Anderson AFB 1860 
 
B.  DATA ANALYSIS 
The following sections provide an analysis of the data based on the given 
operational scenario. 
1. Number of UAVs Required 
A mission flying profile for the UAV can be divided into three parts; ingress, 
loiters, and egress. The UAV is launched from its operating base and ingress to the 
designated AO, then it will loiter above the AO and execute its mission until it runs out of 
fuel and egress back to the operating base for maintenance. Before the UAV flies back 
the operating base, the second UAV would have arrive to replace it so that the mission is 
not disrupted. When the second UAV fuel is low, the third UAV would have arrived to 
replace and the second UAV will return to the operating base. 
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Figure 7 illustrates the typical mission sortie profile of the UAV. 
Figure 7.  Typical Mission Sortie Profile of the UAV [From 9] 
 
 
Table 5 summarizes the cruise speeds and flight endurance times for both the 
Zephyr and the Global Observer used in the calculations: 
Table 5.  Cruise Speed and Endurance Times for Zephyr and Global 
Observer 
Attribute Zephyr Global Observer [9] 
Cruise Speed 15 mph (13 knots)  110 knots 
Endurance 3 months (2160hrs) 7 days (168hrs) 
 
The following key assumptions were made in the computation of the minimum 
number of UAVs required: 
• The returning UAV will have an hour of spare flight time (i.e., reserve fuel 
load) remaining when it arrives back at base.   
• The time required for maintenance is assumed to take an average of 36 hours 
after each mission sortie.  This takes into account the fact that maintenance 
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long as a week at a stretch (for complete structural maintenance and 
inspection) after the UAV is deployed for a certain number of missions.   
• Weather factors such as headwind or tailwind, which may affect the distance 
covered vis-à-vis the endurance of the UAV, is not taken into account in the 
analysis. 
• The time taken to climb to cruise altitude is assumed to be negligible 
compared to the UAV’s flight endurance.   
• Air spares for redundancy coverage are not required. 
• Ground spares were not included in the calculations at this point, but will be 
factored in subsequently for the mission to each of the AOs. 
For each AO, the number of UAVs required is computed based on the following 
formula: 
Number of UAVs Required 
Mission Cycle Time
=  x Number of UAVs required on-station 
UAV Time On-Station
    + 1 Ground Spare
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  
where: 
Mission Cycle Time = UAV Time On-Station + UAV Transit Time 
                                    + UAV Maintenance Time 
 
 is the ceiling function of x x⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  
 
The UAV requirements are summarized in Table 6. UAV Requirements for 
Mission to Respective AO. 
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Table 6. UAV Requirements for Mission to Respective AO 
 Area of Operation Distance (nm) # Zephyr Required (incl. spare) 
1 Trans-Sahara Region 2810 3 
2 Afghanistan / Pakistan 980 3 
3 Iraq 760 3 
4 Colombia 3290 3 
5 Strait of Malacca 2540 3 
6 China / North Korea 1860 3 
Total 18 
 
Based on the operational scenario considered, a total fleet size of 18 Zephyrs are 
required to provide 24/7/365 ISR and communications capabilities. For the Global 
Observer, a total fleet size of 20 units of UAVs is required for provide similar ISR and 
communication capabilities. 
2. Life Cycle Cost Estimates 
The LCCE for both Zephyr and Global Observer are computed over a period of 
15 years based on the following Work Breakdown Structure (WBS): 
Investment 
• Aircraft cost 
• Ground Control System (GCS) cost 
• Payload cost 
Operation and Support 
• Fuel cost 
• Maintenance and Repair cost 
To compute and compare the LCCE of Zephyr vis-à-vis the Global Observer, the 
following key cost considerations will be used.  Manpower costs are assumed to be the 
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same for both, and they are therefore not considered in this analysis; all costs are 
computed in FY08$. Exchange rate for British Pound to U.S. dollars is 1.75. 
a. Aircraft Cost 
   The Average Unit Cost (AUC) of Zephyr aircraft is calculated to be 
$1,738,000 (FY08$). This calculation is based on a Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 
of 6 aircrafts at £1,265,000 per aircraft and a full rate production of 10 aircraft per year, 
for four years, at £1,000,000 per aircraft [22]. 
The AUC of Global Observer is estimated to be $14,200,000 (FY$05). 
b. Ground Control System 
  The GCS cost is calculated to be $217,000 (FY08$). This is based on an 
estimate that the payload is 5% to 20% of the AUC of the aircraft cost [22]. The average 
of this range (i.e. 12.5%) is used as our base case. 
The GCS cost for Global Observer is estimated to be $1,400,000 (FY05$). 
c. Payload Cost 
   The payload cost is calculated to be $217,000 (FY08$). This is based on 
an estimate that the payload is 5% to 20% of the AUC of the aircraft cost [22]. The 
average of this range (i.e. 12.5%) is used as our base case. 
   The payload cost for the Global Observer is estimated to be $5,000,000 
(FY05$). 
d. Fuel Cost 
Zephyr is a solar-powered UAV and does not require fuel for its 
operations. Thus, the fuel cost associated to the Zephyr is zero. However, the fuel cost for 
the Global Observer is estimated to be $11,100,000 per year (FY05$). 
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e. Maintenance and Repair Costs 
Estimated annual maintenance and repair cost for Zephyr are $7,686,000 
(FY08$) per year for a fleet of 18 aircraft. This is based on the cost of consumables and 
spares that was estimated at £100,000 per months for an extended in-theatre deployment 
of five aircraft [22].  
The estimated annual maintenance and repair cost for the Global Observer 
is $2,100,000 (FY05$) per year. 
Table 7 summarizes the costs associated with the WBS for both Zephyr and the 
Global Observer. The costs for Global Observer are converted to CY08$ using Naval 
Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) Inflation Indices [23].  
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Basis of Estimates for 
Zephyr 
Investment 
Aircraft Cost (per 
unit) 
15.3 1.7 
Low Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP) of 6 aircrafts at 
£1,265,000 per aircraft and a 
full rate production of ten 
aircraft per year, for four years, 
at £1,000,000 per aircraft 
Ground Control 
Station Cost (per 
unit) 
1.5 2.2 
Based on an estimate that the 
payload is 5% to 20% of the 
AUC of the aircraft cost. 
The average of this range (i.e. 
12.5%) is used as our base case 
Payload Cost (per 
unit) 
5.4 2.2 
Based on an estimate that the 
payload is 5% to 20% of the 
AUC of the aircraft cost. 
The average of this range (i.e. 
12.5%) is used as our base case 
Operation and Support 







Repair Cost (per 
annum) 
2.7 7.7 
Based on an estimate of the cost 
of consumables and spares at 
£100,000 per months for an 
extended in-theatre deployment 
of five aircraft. 
 
Table 8 summarizes the LCCE of the Zephyr and the Global Observer over a 
period of 15 years. It is assumed that the fuel cost and maintenance and repair costs 
remain constant over this period. 
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Table 8. Summary of Life Cycle Cost (FY08M$) for the Global Observer and 
Zephyr 
Work Breakdown Structure 
Global 
Observer 
Zephyr Delta, $ Delta,% 
Investment     
• Aircraft Cost  306.0 31.3 274.7 89.8 
• Ground Control Station Cost 30.0 3.9 26.1 87.0 
• Payload Cost 107.9 3.9 104.0 96.4 
Operation and Support     
• Fuel Cost 107.0 0 107.0 100 
• Maintenance and Repair 
Cost 
397.0 115.3 281.7 71.0 
Total 949.3 154.4 794.9 83.7 
 
  The estimated LCCE of the Zephyr for 15 years is $154.4M (FY08$), compared 
to the Global Observer’s LCCE of 949.3M (FY08$). This translates to a savings of 
$794,9M, which is approximately 83.7% of the Global Observer’s LCCE. 
C.  RETURN ON INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 
The approach for the Return on Investment (ROI) analysis is to establish a base 
case with quantitative benefits that can be attributed to the operational deployment of the 
Global Observer vis-à-vis the use of the Global Observer, as well as the potential savings 
in commercial satellite communications utilization. 




1. Base Case ROI 
The base case ROI is computed over a period of 15 years from FY 08. The ROI 
computation is performed for two cases; one which does not include the costs of leasing 
commercial satellite bandwidth and one which does include these costs. The cost of using 
commercial satellite bandwidth is estimated to be $40M (FY05$), which is equivalent to 
$41.8M (FY08$). For both cases, it is assumed that the discount factor is zero for the 
computation of NPV. 
For the purpose of comparison, it is assumed that the bandwidth usage for the 
annual in-theater communications remains at $41.8M (FY08$) for subsequent years, 
which translates to an annual potential savings of $41.8M (FY08$), or $627M (FY08$) 
for 15 years. 
 The ROI, without considering the cost avoidance of using commercial satellites 
for acquiring Zephyr, is as follows: 
 
 
        
The ROI, considering the cost avoidance of using commercial satellites for 




          
2. Sensitivity Analysis 
The purpose of sensitivity analysis is to determine the responsiveness of the 
model’s results to uncertainty in the input data. This is important because input data 
typically contain undesired variations and analysis results could reflect this variation 
instead of the true input data value.  Thus, sensitivity analysis provides decision-makers 
with confidence regarding the robustness of the model’s varying input parameters.   
For this study, the factors to be varied are as follow: 
• Aircraft AUC – This factor is varied from $1.5M (FY08$) to 3.5M (FY08$). 
High production costs would reduce the potential benefits of the Zephyr 
system. 
• GCS/ Payload Cost – These factors varied from 5% to 20% of the aircraft 
AUC. The data given by the supplier is as such, and thus a sensitivity analysis 
is performed to determine the effect on the ROI. 
It is assumed that the discount factor to compute NPV is zero. Table 9 
summarizes the factors that varied for the sensitivity analysis. The fuel cost, maintenance 
and repair cost, and discount factors are fixed at zero, $7.7M (FY08$) and zero 
respectively. 
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Table 9. Factors Varied for ROI Sensitivity Analysis 
Analysis AUC (FY08$M) GCS  (% of Aircraft AUC) 
Payload (% of Aircraft 
AUC) 
Base Case $1.7 12.5% 12.5% 
Aircraft AUC $1.5 to $3.5 12.5% 
(of base case AUC) 
12.5% 
(of base case AUC) 
GCS Cost $1.7 5% to 20% 12.5% 
Payload Cost $1.7 12.5% 5% to 20% 
 
a.   Aircraft AUC 
   Figure 8 shows the results of annualized ROI with varying aircraft average 
unit from $1.5M (FY08$) to $3.5M (FY08$).   
Figure 8. Sensitivity Analysis on ROI with Varying Aircraft AUC 
 
   The ROI decreases from approximately 24% to 18% when aircraft AUC 
increases from $1.5M (FY08$) to $3.5M (FY08$). Even if the aircraft AUC is almost 
doubled, from $1.8M (FY08$) to $3.5M (FY08$), ROI remains positive, approximately 
16%. This shows that investment in the Zephyr system is still attractive. 
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b.  GCS/ Payload Cost  
  Figure 9 shows the results of annualized ROI with varying GCS cost or 
payload from 5% to 20% of the aircraft AUC. 
Figure 9. Sensitivity Analysis on ROI with Varying GCS/ Payload Cost 
(in  Percentage of Aircraft AUC)  
 
  ROI decreases from approximately 23% to 22% when the GCS cost 
increases from 5% to 20% of the aircraft AUC. The result is insensitive to this variation 
and, hence, has no significant impact on the ROI calculated.   
D.  RATIO OF INVESTMENT COST ANALYSIS 
In addition to ROI and sensitivity analysis, it is also pertinent to examine the ratio 
of investment cost of the Zephyr system compared to the Global Observer system. 
Zephyr is a small UAV with limited payload capacity, and thus its ability to provide ISR 
and communications capabilities is significantly restricted as compared to Global 
Observer. From this angle, investment in the Zephyr system would seem unattractive. 
However, if the number of Zephyr systems that can be acquired, compared to the amount 
of investment required for one unit of Global Observer, is significant, acquiring Zephyr 
systems could be more attractive. In addition, if the supplier is able to push down the 
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costs of the Zephyr system, this would in turn increase the number of Zephyr systems that 
can be acquired, making the investment more attractive. 
1. Ratio of Investment Cost for Zephyr System to Global Observer 
System 
The investment costs for Zephyr and Global Observer systems to accomplish the 
missions defined in section A, is shown in Table 10. Investment Costs (FY08$M) for 
Single Zephyr and Global  Observer Systems 
Table 10. Investment Costs (FY08$M) for Single Zephyr and Global  
Observer Systems 
 Global Observe  Zephyr  
Aircraft cost  
(unit production cost) $15.3 $1,74 
Ground Control System  
(unit cost) $1.53 $0.217 
Payload Cost  
(unit cost) $5.40 $0.217 
Total $22.2 $2.17 
 
The base case calculation for the ratio of investment cost of Global Observer 




From the base case analysis, it can be seen that for every one unit of the Global 
Observer System purchased, ten units of the Zephyr system can be acquired. Table 11 
shows the number of Zephyr systems that can be acquired given a reduction in the unit 
cost of the Zephyr system. 
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Table 11.  Number of Zephyr System Given Reduction in Unit Cost 
Unit Cost of Zephyr System 
(FY08$M) 
No. of Zephyr Systems 
(Units) 
$ 2.2 10 
$ 1.8 12 
$ 1.4 15 
$ 1.0 22 
$ 0.6 37 
 
When the supplier reduces the unit cost for Zephyr systems from $2.2 (FY08$M) 
to $0.6 (FY08$M), the number of Zephyr systems that can be acquired increases from ten 
units to 37 units. As the number of Zephyr units increases, the attractiveness of the 
investment increases; this could drive the supplier to keep the unit cost of the Zephyr 
system as low as possible. 
E.  RATIO OF NET PRESENT VALUE OF LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATES 
ANALYSIS 
In addition to the ratio of investment cost for the Global Observer system 
compared to the Zephyr system, it is also appropriate to look at the respective Net Present 
Value (NPV) of their LCCEs. The LCCE is the estimated total cost incurred, expressed in 
present worth, for a particular system over its entire useful life. This estimate includes 
research and development (R&D), investment, operation and support (O&S), and 
disposal cost. This is useful as the LCCE not only provides the present cost of procuring a 
system, but also the future cost of use over its lifetime. Thus, if the ratio of these NPVs is 
taken into consideration, then the number of Zephyr systems that could be acquired and 
supported throughout its lifetime, given the amount of capital needed to acquire and 
support one unit of the Global Observer system, can be determined. The higher the ratio, 
the more attractive the investment in the Zephyr system over the Global Observer system 
becomes. For our LCC estimates, only investment and O&S costs are considered.  
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1.  Base Case Ratio of NPV of LCCE 
The base case NPV of LCCE is computed over a period of 15 years with the base 
year fixed at FY 08 and a discount rate of zero percent. The computation of NPV of 




-  PV of Investment includes PV Aircraft Cost, PV GCS Cost and PV 
Payload Cost over n period, 
- A is the annual O&S Cost,  
- i is the discount factor, 
- n is the number of periods (years) of the system’s lifetime. 
For this analysis, all costs are expressed in FY08$. 
If the discount rate is zero percent, which means that the value of money does not 
decrease over time, NPV is calculated based on the following: 
 
The PV of LCCE for investment and O&S are based on the estimates derived for 
the base case ROI analysis presented in Table 7. The results of the LCC estimates are 
presented in Table 8 with the NPVs of the systems is the summation of their respective 
investment and O&S PVs.  The NPV for Global Observer is $949,300K (FY08$) and the 
NPV for Zephyr system is $154,404K (FY08$), assuming a discount factor of zero. 
Thus, the ratio of NPV of LCCE for the Global Observer System compared to 







The ratio of NPV of LCCE for the Global Observer system as compared to LCC 
estimate for the Zephyr system is six. This implies that six units of the Zephyr system can 
be acquired and supported over its lifetime, given the amount of capital to acquire and 
support one unit Global Observer.  
2.  Sensitivity Analysis   
A sensitivity analysis is conducted on the base case analysis to provide insights 
and confidence to decision-makers regarding the analysis when subjected to uncertainties 
in the factors. For this study, the factors to be varied are as follows:  
• Discount Factor – This factor varies from 0% to 20%. A large discount factor 
would affect the LCCE for Zephyr in terms of total cost.  
• Aircraft AUC – This factor varies from $2.2M (FY08$) to $0.6M (FY08$). A 
lower aircraft AUC would affect the investment cost, which will invariably 
affect the LCCE for Zephyr. 
• GCS/ Payload Cost – These factors vary from 5% to 20% of the aircraft AUC.  
This data range is provided by the supplier and thus a sensitivity analysis is 
performed to determine the effect on the result. 
• O&S Cost – This factor is varied from $7.7M (FY08$) to $4.0M (FY08$). A 
lower O&S cost would translate to a lower LCCE for Zephyr. 
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Table 12 summarizes the factors that are varied for the sensitivity analysis. The 
fuel cost, maintenance and repair cost, and discount factors are fixed at zero, $7.7M 
(FY08$), and zero respectively. 





 (% of Aircraft 
AUC) 
Payload  








Base Case $1.7 12.5% 12.5% $7.7 0% 
Aircraft AUC $2.2 to $0.6 12.5% (of base case AUC) 
12.5% (of base 
case AUC) $7.7 0% to 20% 
GCS Cost $1.7 5% and 20% 12.5% $7.7 0% to 20% 
Payload Cost $1.7 12.5% 5% and 20% $7.7 0% to 20% 
Maintenance & 
Repair cost $1.7 12.5% 12.5% 
$7.7M to 
$4.0M 0% to 20% 
 
a.  Aircraft AUC 
  The aircraft AUC for the Zephyr system varies from $2,200K (FY08$) to 
$600K (FY08$) with a discount factor varying from 0% to 20% and the payload/GCS is 
fixed at 12.5% of the aircraft AUC used in our base case analysis. This GCS/Payload cost 
will not change as we vary our aircraft AUC in this sensitivity analysis. 
  The results of the ratio of NPV to LCCE for the Global Observer system 




Figure 10.  Ratio of NPV of LCCE for Global Observer System to Zephyr  
System with Varying Aircraft AUC 
 
 
As the Zephyr aircraft AUC decreases or/and the discount factor increases, the 
ratio of NPV to LCCE for the Global Observer system compared to the Zephyr system 
increases. This is because as the Zephyr aircraft AUC decreases, more units of the Zephyr 
system can be acquired and supported throughout its life cycle, given the capital to 
acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer system. Similarly, when the discount 
rate increases, the annual O&S cost will become less expensive over the years and thus 
drive down costs.  
The ratio ranges from four to ten, which implies that from four to ten units of the 
Zephyr system can be acquired and supported throughout its life cycle given the capital to 
acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer system. 
b.  GCS/Payload Cost 
  The GCS/Payload cost for Zephyr system varies from 5% to 20% of the 
aircraft AUC. This analysis is carried out in two parts, where the extreme values for the 
GCS/Payload cost for Zephyr system are fixed at 5% and 20% of the aircraft AUC is 
pegged to the value used for the base case. The discount factor varies from 0% to 20% 
and the aircraft AUC varies from $2,200K (FY08$) to $600K (FY08$). 
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    (1)   GCS/Payload cost for Zephyr system fixed at 5%. The 
results of the ratio of NPV to LCCE for the Global Observer system compared to the 
Zephyr system with GCS/Payload fixed at 5% is shown in Figure 11. 
Figure 11. Ratio of NPV of LCCE for Global Observer System to Zephyr 
System with Varying AUC and GCS/ Payload fixed at 5% 
  
 
   As the Zephyr aircraft AUC decreases or/and the discount factor 
increases, the ratio of the NPV to LCCE for Global Observer system compared to the 
Zephyr system increases. The ratio ranges from four to ten, which implies that from four 
units to ten units of the Zephyr system can be acquired and supported throughout its life 
cycle, given the capital to acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer system. 
This is similar to the analysis where the GCS/Payload cost for the Zephyr system is fixed 
at 12.5%.  
    (2)  GCS/ Payload cost for Zephyr system fixed at 20%.The 
results of the ratio of NPV to LCCE for the Global Observer system compared to the 
Zephyr system with GCS/Payload fixed at 20% is shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. Ratio of NPV of LCCE for Global Observer System to Zephyr System 
  with Varying AUC and GCS/ Payload fixed at 20% 
 
   As Zephyr aircraft AUC decreases or/and the discount factor 
increases, the ratio of the NPV of LCCE for the Global Observer system compared to the 
Zephyr system increases. The ratio ranges from four to ten, which implies that from four 
to ten units of the Zephyr system can be acquired and supported throughout its life cycle, 
given the capital to acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer system. This is 
similar to the analysis where the GCS/Payload cost for the Zephyr system is fixed at 
12.5%.  
   The GCS/Payload cost for the Zephyr system does not change the 
results of the ratio to the NPV of LCCE for the Global Observer system compared to 
Zephyr system and thus it is insensitive in this analysis. 
b. O&S Cost 
  The annual O&S cost for the Zephyr system varies from $7,700 (FY08$K) 
to $4,000 (FY08$K) over its 15-year life cycle period, with the discount factor varying 
from 0% to 20%. 
  The results of the ratio of NPV to LCCE for the Global Observer system 
compared to the Zephyr system with a varying O&S cost is shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Ratio of NPV of LCCE for Global Observer System to Zephyr  
System with Varying O&S Cost 
 
As the annual O&S cost decreases or/and the discount factor increases, the ratio 
of the NPV to LCCE for the Global Observer system compared to the Zephyr system 
increases. This is because as the annual O&S cost decreases, more units of the Zephyr 
system can be acquired and supported throughout its life cycle, given the capital to 
acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer system. Similarly, when the discount 
rate increases, the annual O&S cost becomes less expensive over the years, and thus 
drives Zephyr’s cost down further. 
The ratio ranges from four to eight, which implies that from four ten units of the 
Zephyr system can be acquired and supported throughout its life cycle, given the capital 
to acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer system. 
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F.  RISK ANALYSIS 
While conducting the analysis of the ROI and LCCE for Zephyr is essential for 
any BCA, it is also important to look at the potential risk involved in this solar power 
concept that provides Zephyr’s long flight endurance.   
The concept of solar power has been in the industrial base for a while and is used 
in many areas, such as solar thermal and electrical generation. However, the use of solar 
power in HALE UAVs is a recent concept and not many developers have claimed success 
in its development yet. According to UAV International [4], all solar-powered UAV 
systems are still in the “proof of concept/development continuing” stage, which sees 
developers and optimistic investors putting enormous efforts and investments into 
ensuring that this concept is fundamentally sound and feasible. 
As with all new concepts or products, there are risks involved. One of the risks is 
its low reliability (high failure rate) in the early stage of the system’s life cycle, or its 
“infant mortality stage” as characterized by the bathtub curve in Figure 14.  
Figure 14. Bathtub Curve [From 24] 
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These failures are typically caused by defects that are designed into or built into 
solar-powered UAVs. Depending on how efficient manufacturers are in detecting and 
remedying these faults during the testing phase, the high failure rate of the systems might 
spill over into the early stages of actual operations, which is highly unacceptable if the 
Zephyr is to be deployed on a critical mission.  
Although Zephyr has claimed successes in many of its flight demonstrations, 
including the latest flight demonstration at the Yuma Proving Ground where a record 
flight endurance of 82 hours and 37 minutes [20] was recorded, the reliability of the 
systems should be seriously considered if Zephyr is to be deployed for any critical 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This report has presented a generic structure for performing a business case 
analysis, with specific application to the Zephyr JCTD.  The BCA compares the 
performance of Zephyr with Global Observer (augmented with existing commercial 
satellite communications networks) in an operational scenario consisting of a 24/7/365 
ISR and communications mission.  Life Cycle Costs (LCC) consist of investment costs, 
as well as the O&S of the platform over a 15-year period. 
The key results of the business case analyses are summarized as follows: 
• The total LCCE savings for acquiring and operating Zephyr over Global 
Observer over 15 year period is estimated to be $794M (FY08$) starting from 
FY08.   
- The investment savings is $405M (FY08$), or approximately 91% of the 
investment cost for Global Observer. 
- The operating and support savings is $389M (FY08$), or approximately 
77% of the operating and support cost for Global Observer. 
• There is also an estimated potential cost avoidance of $41.8M (FY08$) per 
annum on commercial satellite bandwidth usage if Zephyr can be deployed to 
provide tactical battlefield communications over the area of interest, an 
addition to its ISR mission. 
• The base case annualized compounded ROI over a 15-year period starting 
from FY08 is 22%, based on a NPV saving of $793,497K (FY08$). 
• The base case annualized ROI decreases to about 16% when the Zephyr 
aircraft AUC increases from $1.8M to $3.5M (FY08$), almost doubling the 
estimated aircraft AUC used in the base case analysis. 
• The base case annualized ROI does change significantly when the CGS cost 
or the payload is varied from 5% to 20% of the aircraft AUC. The ROI 
remains at approximately 22% to 23%.   
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• The number of Zephyr systems that can be purchased given the funds to 
purchase one unit of the Global Observer system is ten, at a cost of $2,200K 
(FY08$). This increases to 37 when the unit cost of the Zephyr system is 
reduced to $600K (FY08$) for a 15-year period starting from FY08. 
• The number of Zephyr systems that can be purchased and supported given the 
funds to purchase and support one unit of Global Observer systems, is six at a 
cost of $154,404K (FY08$) for a 15-year period starting from FY08. 
• The number of Zephyr systems than can be acquired and supported given the 
funds to acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer system ranges 
from four to ten when the aircraft AUC decreases from $1.8M (FY08$) to 
$0.6M (FY08$) with a discount rate increasing from 0% to 20%. 
• The number of Zephyr systems than can be acquired and supported given the 
funds to acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer system remains 
from four to ten when the aircraft AUC decreases from $1.8M (FY08$) to 
$0.6M (FY08$) with a discount rate increases from 0% to 20% and a GCS or 
payload cost which varies from 5% to 20% of the Zephyr aircraft AUC. 
• The number of Zephyr systems than can be acquired and supported given the 
funds to acquire and support one unit of the Global Observer systems ranges 
from four to ten when the annual O&S cost decreases from $7.7M (FY08$) to 
$4M (FY08$) with a discount rate increasing from 0% to 20%.  
• The reliability of the Zephyr system remains uncertain even though it has 
claimed success in its flight demonstrations. 
The benefits of the Zephyr should not be limited to the factors presented in this 
study, as these factors are by no means a comprehensive list of factors by which the 
Zephyr ought to be measured.  The very fact of a HALE UAV achieving 82 hours and 37 
minutes of flight endurance is already a significant milestone for the solar-powered UAV 
concept, especially given that currently, operational UAVs can achieve no more than two  
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days of flight endurance. Thus, Zephyr appears to be a worthwhile investment that can 
provide the DoD with a new capability in round-the-clock ISR and battlefield 
communications. 
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APPENDIX A.  DETAILS OF ZEPHYR JCTD PROGRAM [24] 
A. PHASE 1: AIRFRAME DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION 
This work is focused on development and validation of the Zephyr 7 platform, 
which will form the basis of operational capability, and demonstration of the system’s 
ability to provide a solution for a US JUONS. 
Two main strands of activity are: 
• Re-flight of the existing Zephyr 6 system with the objective of a) 
demonstrating in-flight operation of a JUONS payload and b) de-risking the 
Zephyr 7 development program by providing an early flight test of some of 
the key subsystems (e.g., direct-drive motors) that are proposed for Zephyr 7. 
Preparations for this demonstration are already underway and the flight test is 
scheduled for June 2008.  
• Detailed design, assembly, integration, ground test and flight validation of the 
Zephyr 7 aero-structural design with the aim of confirming its flight efficiency 
and ability to meet the 2009 performance targets as outlined in section 3. The 
Zephyr 7 proving flight is provisionally scheduled for Summer 2009. 
The design specifications for the Zephyr 7 airframe are expected to be finalized in 
Autumn 2008 and confirmed as appropriate for operational use following the validation 
flight in Summer 2009. 
B. PHASE 2: OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS AND LRIP  
PREPARATIONS 
This Phase covers a number of activities that are needed to provide a complete 
operational system capability and to enable the start of Low Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP). The design specifications of the operational system components (other than 
airframe) are expected to be completed by Summer 2009. 
 54
The principal tasks in this Phase are: 
• Operational system requirements capture and design specification for: 
- Operational system Ground Control Station (GCS): The GCS to be used to 
support the Zephyr 7 aero-structural validation flight in Summer 2009 will 
be an upgraded version of the Zephyr 6 GCS, which has been designed 
principally for flight trial use. This system will be upgraded to an 
operational capability by implementing a number of changes aimed at 
reducing the operator workload and thereby enabling system operation 
with a reduced crew. 
- Operational system communication links: Potential improvements to the 
existing Zephyr communication links are to be reviewed with the aim of 
improving link robustness and security in an operational environment. 
These improvements will involve implementation of digital 
communications links. 
- Transponders and any other devices required by the regulatory authorities, 
to be captured in a Minimum Equipment List 
- Network connectivity and interoperability with other command, control 
and communication systems 
• Preparatory work for LRIP, including 
- Negotiation with and appointment of a US production partner. Key 
considerations in the selection of a production partner include the 
following: 
• Future volume production capability (workshop facility and workforce 
size issues); 
• Skilled workforce (technical competency and training issues); 
• Appropriate cost base for volume production (wage and 
accommodation cost issues); 
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• Logistics for transport and in-service support; 
• Supply base management; 
• Adaptability for innovation within relatively small production runs; 
• Experience of aircraft type certification and production quality 
systems. 
- Partner review of production processes and setting up of necessary tooling 
and workshops. As an input to this activity, QinetiQ will provide a technical 
data pack comprised of the following items, with the documentation 
developed in sufficient detail to enable any competent company to produce 
the complete system to the required level of quality from the information 
supplied: 
• Specifications; 
• Designs;  
• Bill of materials; 
• Tooling; 
• Test procedures; 
• Quality standards. 
C.   PHASE 3: LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION (LRIP), OPERATIONAL   
DOCUMENTATION AND TRAINING 
This phase will involve production of a small number (∼5, TBC) of Zephyr 7 
airframes by the selected production partner. A small number (∼2, TBC) of GCS units 
will also be produced in this phase to support the delivered aircraft. 
This activity will be initiated as early as possible in 2009. However, as the Zephyr 
7 aero-structural design will not be fully validated until Summer 2009, and the 




activity will focus on trial production runs aimed at establishing the efficiency of the 
airframe production processes and the procurement of long lead materials and parts for 
further builds. 
  A complete set of operational procedure documentation will be developed and 
delivered with the initial production platforms and GCS units.  As a minimum, this is 
expected to include: 
• Launch procedure; 
• Flight operations procedure; 
• Ground station operations procedure; 
• Payload operation procedure(s); 
• Recovery procedure; 
• Ground handling procedure(s); 
• Engineering maintenance procedure(s); 
• Equipment storage requirements. 
A training program covering all aspects of Zephyr operations from mission 
planning to ground handling, launch, flight operations, payload operations and platform 
recovery will be developed based on a Training Needs Analysis (TNA). It should be 
noted that some parts of the TNA cannot be undertaken until the operational GCS design 
is finalized (under Phase 2). Also, the TNA will need to be undertaken in close liaison 
with the end-user community. Equipment requirements to support the training program 
are to be confirmed but are expected to include a GCS and/or mission simulator. Training 
manuals will be provided based on the operational procedure documentation.  
Planning will need to be undertaken to ensure that adequate support and 
maintenance measures are in place when the system enters operational use. Issues to be 
addressed include manpower requirements, in terms of numbers and skill sets, and spares 
policy (items, numbers, storage times and locations). 
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This phase will complete at the end of 2009 so that the delivered aircraft and GCS 
units are available for deployment and in-theatre operational use beginning in 2010. 
D.  PHASE 4: PREPARATIONS FOR VOLUME PRODUCTION AND   
MILITARY CERTIFICATION  
This work covers those activities needed to prepare for routine production and 
certification of the system, and includes: 
• Identification of requirements and necessary preparation for ongoing 
“volume” production (e.g., ∼25-30 units per annum, TBC) by the production 
partner. 
- The critical suppliers to the Zephyr program will need to be contacted or 
visited to confirm and if necessary improve their ability to support a 
volume production operation. Where the Zephyr supply chain is currently 
single source, alternative suppliers should ideally be identified. 
- Among the issues to be considered in planning for future volume 
production is the limited lifetime of the solar cells and batteries. This will 
prevent the very long-term (>2 year) storage of fully integrated Zephyr 
platforms and large-scale production in advance of any specific mission 
requirement is therefore unlikely to be a sensible strategy. A cost-effective 
strategy which could ensure the timely availability of Zephyr platforms 
without risking sub-system degradation due to extended storage would be 
to procure the structure in a semi-complete form, without the power 
system components. Procurement and integration of the limited shelf-life 
components could then be undertaken on a relatively short timescale 
following notification of a specific mission requirement. This is 
considered a viable strategy subject to confirmation that the sub-system 
suppliers can deliver within a reasonable timescale. 
• Construction and flight of a small number (∼5, TBC) of additional aircraft in 
order to accumulate the flying hours needed to establish the system reliability 
and safety record and to achieve military certification. 
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E.  PHASE 5: VOLUME PRODUCTION 
This phase will start on completion of the preparatory activities under Phase 4 and 
confirmation of volume production orders. 
Volume production requirements may be influenced not only by operational needs 
but also by the extent of component re-use and platform refurbishment. Previous flight 
trials have demonstrated that a Zephyr platform can be recovered essentially intact but 
operational experience will be required before usage statistics can be confirmed, e.g., in 
terms of average number of missions per platform, damage and loss rate, etc.  
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APPENDIX B. ESTIMATION OF ZEPHYR AUC  
A.  OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this study is to estimate the Zephyr aircraft AUC by establishing 
a cost estimate relationship using the cost (response) as a function of flight endurance, 
minimum take-off weight, engine thrust and payload weight (regressors).  
B.  METHODOLOGY 
  The data used to establish the cost establish relationship is taken from open 
sources and is tabulated in table B1 below: 
Table B1.  UAVs Data Set 









Predator 440 40.00 1040 73.00 3.20 [26] 
Eagle Eye 136 4.00 1020 313.00 5.50 [27] 
Altair 299 30.00 3266 708.00 8.00 [28] 
Skywarrior 227 36.00 1500 99.00 8.00 [29] 
Mariner 907 49.00 5000 708.00 13.00 [30] 
Heron 250 40.00 1100 73.00 6.50 [30] 
Darkstar 455 12.00 3091 - 10.00 [31] 
Global Hawk 1360 36.00 14630 - 35.00 [32] 
Global 
Observer 450 24.00 4100 - 18.50 
[33] 
Pioneer 34 5.00 205 19.00 0.90 [34] 
Dragon Eye 2 0.75 3 - 0.07 [35] 
Shadow 25 6.00 90 - 0.50 [36] 
Polecat 450 4.00 - - 27.00 [37] 
 
 60
Table B2 shows the regression analyses carried out to determine the best CER 
model for the above database. 
Table B2.  Regression Analysis Model 
Analysis 
No. CER 
1 Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) 
2 Cost = βo + β1 (Endurance) 
3 Cost = βo + β1 (MTOW) 
4 Cost = βo + β1 (Thrust) 
5 Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (Endurance) 
6 Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (MTOW) 
7 Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (Thrust) 
8 Cost = βo + β1 (Endurance) + β2 (MTOW) 
9 Cost = βo + β1 (Endurance) +  β2 (Thrust) 
10 Cost = βo + β1 (MTOW) + β2 (Thrust) 
11 Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (Endurance) + β3 (MTOW) 
12 Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (Endurance) +  β3 (Thrust) 
13 Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (MTOW) + β3 (Thrust) 
14 Cost = βo + β1 (Endurance) + β2 (MTOW) + β3 (Thrust) 
15 Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (Endurance) + β3 (MTOW) + β4 (Thrust) 
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C.  RESULTS 
The results of the regression analyses for all the possible CER are tabulated in 
table B3 with their respective R-Square value and F-value: 
Table B3.  R-Square and F-Value Results from the Linear Regression Analysis 
Analysis 
No. CER R Square F-Value 
1 Cost = 1.69 + 0.0227 (Payload) 0.667 22.0 
2 Cost = 7.33 + 0.142 (Endurance) 0.054 0.628 
3 Cost = 2.27 + 0.00234 (MTOW) 0.930 133 
4 Cost = 3.74 + 0.00951 (Thrust)  0.556 6.27 
5 Cost = 4.36 + 0.0286 (Payload)  - 0.224 (Endurance) 0.754 15.4 
6 Cost = 2.26 + 9.44E-05 (Payload) + 0.00232 (MTOW) 0.930 59.6 
7 Cost = 2.65 + 0.00660 (Payload) + 0.00573 (Thrust) 0.705 4.78 
8 Cost = 1.75 + 0.0284 (Endurance) + 0.00229 (MTOW) 0.932 61.5 
9 Cost = 1.16 + 0.104 (Endurance) +  0.00789 (Thrust) 0.769 6.65 
10 Cost = 2.42 + 0.00283 (MTOW) – 0.00449 (Thrust) 0.831 9.83 
11 Cost = 1.72 – 0.00406 (Payload) + 0.0551 (Endurance) + 0.00261 (MTOW) 0.934 37.5 
12 Cost = 1.26 + 0.00110 (Payload) + 0.0929 (Endurance) +  0.00744 (Thrust) 0.770 3.36 
13 Cost = 2.63 – 0.00605 (Payload) + 0.00451 (MTOW) – 0.00936 (Thrust) 0.858 6.06 
14 Cost = 2.21 + 0.0137 (Endurance) + 0.00255 (MTOW) – 0.00333 (Thrust) 0.832 4.95 
15 Cost = 2.28 – 0.00632 (Payload) + 0.0236 (Endurance) + 0.00411 (MTOW) – 0.00759 (Thrust) 0.861 3.11 
             
From the results generated, Analysis 3 gives the best CER model, with a high R-
square value and F-value, suggesting that the high degree of variability in the model is 
explained by the parameter MTOW and is significant in the model in the presence of 
other parameters. 
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 However, this CER is not used in the Zephyr Aircraft AUC calculation because 
the cost data found in the open source lacks critical information. The sources did not 
specify for which year the cost was computed and it also did not specify the components 
that contribute to the cost.  Thus, the cost stated in the source could be cost for acquiring 
the aircraft only, the cost of acquiring the aircraft plus the logistics support etc. Therefore, 
this computation is not used to predict the Zephyr aircraft AUC. 
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D.  RESULTS SUMMARY OUTPUT 
SUMMARY OUTPUT (ANALYSIS 1: Cost = βo + β1 (Payload)) 
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.816391925      
R Square 0.666495775      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.636177209      
Standard 
Error 6.39962861      
Observations 13      
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 1 900.3228825 900.322882 21.9830903 0.000662245  
Residual 11 450.5077098 40.9552463    
Total 12 1350.830592        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 1.691284475 2.580595078 0.65538545 0.52568885 -3.988566992 7.37113594 
Payload (kg) 0.022674343 0.004836045 4.68861284 0.00066224 0.012030279 0.03331840 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       




(million) Residuals     
1 11.66799527 -8.467995273     
2 4.774995085 0.725004915     
3 8.470912949 -0.470912949     
4 6.844544185 1.155455815     
5 22.25691333 -9.256913325     
6 7.359870156 -0.859870156     
7 12.00811041 -2.008110414     
8 32.52839058 2.471609421     
9 11.8947387 6.6052613     
10 2.462212127 -1.562212127     
11 1.743435463 -1.678435463     
12 2.258143043 -1.758143043     
13 11.8947387 15.1052613     




SUMMARY OUTPUT (ANALYSIS 2: Cost = βo + β1 (Endurance))  
        
Regression Statistics       
Multiple R 0.232348791       
R Square 0.053985961       
Adjusted R 
Square -0.032015315       
Standard 
Error 10.77836513       
Observations 13       
        
ANOVA        
  Df SS MS F 
Significance 
F   
Regression 1 72.92588753 72.9258875 0.6277344 0.444938698   
Residual 11 1277.904705 116.173155     
Total 12 1350.830592         
        
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%  
Intercept 7.326719511 4.9717475 1.47367088 0.1686024 -3.61602294 18.2694619  
Endurance 
(hrs) 0.142694495 0.180102296 0.79229692 0.4449387 -0.253707985 0.53909697  
 
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT        
        
Observation 
Predicted Cost 
USD (million) Residuals      
1 13.0344993 -9.83449929      
2 7.89749749 -2.39749749      
3 11.60755435 -3.607554352      
4 12.46372132 -4.46372132      
5 14.31874975 -1.318749752      
6 13.0344993 -6.534499299      
7 9.039053447 0.960946553      
8 12.46372132 22.53627868      
9 10.75138738 7.748612616      
10 8.040191984 -7.140191984      
11 7.433740382 -7.368740382      
12 8.182886479 -7.682886479      
13 7.89749749 19.10250251      
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SUMMARY OUTPUT (ANALYSIS 3: Cost = βo + β1 (MTOW))  
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.964280391      
R Square 0.929836672      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.922820339      
Standard 
Error 2.720666919      
Observations 12      
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 1 980.9508381 980.9508 132.5246 4.3127E-07  
Residual 10 74.02028483 7.402028    
Total 11 1054.971123        
       
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 2.267299071 0.984284154 2.303500 0.043991 0.07417731 4.4604208 
MTOW (kg) 0.002338654 0.00020315 11.51193 4.313E-07 0.00188606 0.0027913 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       
       
Observation 
Predicted Cost 
USD (million) Residuals     
1 4.699498736 1.49949873     
2 4.652725665 0.847274335     
3 9.90534148 -1.90534148     
4 5.775279357 2.224720643     
5 13.96056669 -0.960566691     
6 4.839817947 1.660182053     
7 9.496077113 0.503922887     
8 36.48180013 -1.481800127     
9 11.85577852 6.644221481     
10 2.746723043 -1.846723043     
11 2.273613435 -2.208613435     
12 2.477777888 -1.977777888     




SUMMARY OUTPUT (ANALYSIS 4: Cost = βo + β1 (Thrust)) 
        
Regression Statistics       
Multiple R 0.74595636       
R Square 0.55645089       
Adjusted R 
Square 0.46774107       
Standard 
Error 2.82521791       
Observations 7       
        
ANOVA        
  Df SS MS F 
Significance 
F   
Regression 1 50.0678616 50.0678616 6.2727090 0.05418856   
Residual 5 39.9092811 7.98185623     
Total 6 89.9771428         
        
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%  Upper 95% 
Intercept 3.73590624 1.51935315 2.45887944 0.0573074 ‐0.16971538  7.64152786 
Thrust (kW) 0.00950760 0.00379615 2.50453768 0.0541885 ‐0.00025071  0.01926592 
        
        
        
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT        






Residuals     
1 4.42996138 -1.22996139 -0.47690311     
2 6.71178653 -1.21178654 -0.46985602     
3 10.4672904 -2.46729042 -0.95666293     
4 4.67715911 3.32284088 1.28839258     
5 10.4672904 2.53270957 0.98202844     
6 4.42996138 2.07003861 0.80263319     
7 3.91655073 -3.01655073 -1.16963217     




SUMMARY OUTPUT (ANALYSIS 5: Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (Endurance)) 
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.964281403      
R Square 0.929838624      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.914247207      
Standard 
Error 2.867794847      
Observations 12      
       
ANOVA       
  Df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 2 980.9528973 490.476448 59.6378527 6.41862E-06  
Residual 9 74.01822558 8.22424728    
Total 11 1054.971123        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 2.256567826 1.239499107 1.82054816 0.10201451 -0.54737395 5.060509603 
Payload (kg) 9.4434E-05 0.005967912 0.01582362 0.98772033 -0.01340592 0.013594788 
MTOW (kg) 0.002329972 0.000588981 3.95593730 0.00332466 0.00099760 0.003662339 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       




(million) Residuals     
1 4.721289133 -1.521289133     
2 4.645981777 0.854018223     
3 9.894490505 -1.894490505     
4 5.772987343 2.227012657     
5 13.99207694 -0.99207694     
6 4.843144969 1.656855031     
7 9.501477191 0.498522809     
8 36.47248108 -1.472481081     
9 11.85194627 6.648053734     
10 2.737422739 -1.837422739     
11 2.263075947 -2.198075947     
12 2.46862611 -1.96862611     
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SUMMARY OUTPUT (ANALYSIS 6: Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (MTOW)) 
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.964281403      
R Square 0.929838624      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.914247207      
Standard 
Error 2.867794847      
Observations 12      
       
ANOVA       
  Df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 2 980.9528973 490.476448 59.6378527 6.4186E-06  
Residual 9 74.01822558 8.22424728    
Total 11 1054.971123        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 2.256567826 1.239499107 1.82054816 0.10201451 -0.54737395 5.060509603 
Payload (kg) 9.4434E-05 0.005967912 0.01582362 0.98772033 -0.01340592 0.013594788 
MTOW (kg) 0.002329972 0.000588981 3.95593730 0.00332466 0.00099760 0.003662339 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       
       
Observation 
Predicted Cost 
USD (million) Residuals     
1 4.721289133 -1.521289133     
2 4.645981777 0.854018223     
3 9.894490505 -1.894490505     
4 5.772987343 2.227012657     
5 13.99207694 -0.99207694     
6 4.843144969 1.656855031     
7 9.501477191 0.498522809     
8 36.47248108 -1.472481081     
9 11.85194627 6.648053734     
10 2.737422739 -1.837422739     
11 2.263075947 -2.198075947     
12 2.46862611 -1.96862611     
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SUMMARY OUTPUT (ANLYSIS 7: Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (Thrust))  
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.839541169      
R Square 0.704829375      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.557244062      
Standard Error 2.576752294      
Observations 7      
       
ANOVA       
  Df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 2 63.41853332 31.70926666 4.77574198 0.087125698  
Residual 4 26.55860953 6.639652383    
Total 6 89.97714286        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 2.649570292 1.583402564 1.67333965 0.16957510 -1.746660006 7.04580059 
Payload (kg) 0.006597486 0.004652642 1.41800867 0.22916904 -0.006320318 0.01951529 
Thrust (kW) 0.005731647 0.004367873 1.312228368 0.25967791 -0.006395513 0.01785880 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       
       
Observation 
Predicted Cost 
USD (million) Residuals 
Standard 
Residuals    
1 5.970874431 -2.770874431 -1.317012216    
2 5.340833995 0.159166005 0.075652498    
3 8.680224898 -0.680224898 -0.323314724    
4 4.716432033 3.283567967 1.56069834    
5 12.69149645 0.308503546 0.146633472    
6 4.71735207 1.78264793 0.847302597    
7 2.982786118 -2.082786118 -0.989959967    
       




SUMMARY OUTPUT: (ANALYSIS: Cost = βo + β1 (Endurance) + β2 (MTOW)) 
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.965329203      
R Square 0.93186047      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.916718352      
Standard 
Error 2.826172057      
Observations 12      
       
ANOVA       
  Df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 2 983.0858864 491.54294 61.540960 5.62725E-06  
Residual 9 71.88523647 7.9872485    
Total 11 1054.971123        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 1.747615289 1.433789555 1.2188785 0.2538730 -1.495842016 4.99107259 
MTOW (kg) 0.002287182 0.000233332 9.8022505 4.224E-06 0.001759348 0.00281501 
Endurance 
(hrs) 0.028435008 0.054998151 0.5170175 0.6176086 -0.095979454 0.15284946 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       





Residuals     
1 5.263685206 -2.063685206     
2 4.194281282 1.305718718     
3 10.07060296 -2.070602964     
4 6.20204904 1.79795096     
5 14.57684225 -1.576842246     
6 5.400916145 1.099083855     
7 9.15851592 0.84148408     
8 36.23275285 -1.232752846     
9 11.80750297 6.692497031     
10 2.358662702 -1.458662702     
11 1.775116937 -1.710116937     
12 2.124071744 -1.624071744     
       
 




SUMMARY OUTPUT (ANALYSIS 9: Cost = βo + β1 (Endurance) +  β2 (Thrust)) 
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.876863266      
R Square 0.768889188      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.653333782      
Standard Error 2.280059789      
Observations 7      
       
ANOVA       
  Df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 2 69.18245229 34.59122615 6.6538573 0.053412208  
Residual 4 20.79469056 5.198672641    
Total 6 89.97714286        
       
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 1.15905735 1.819191456 0.637127745 0.5586814 -3.891827864 6.20994256 
Endurance 
(hrs) 0.104235145 0.054359807 1.91750394 0.1276378 -0.046691876 0.25516216 
Thrust (kW) 0.007888926 0.003177814 2.482501046 0.0680285 -0.000934099 0.01671195 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       
       
Observation 
Predicted Cost 
USD (million) Residuals 
Standard 
Residuals    
1 5.904354728 -2.70435472 -1.452656899    
2 4.045231682 1.454768318 0.781435664    
3 9.871471114 -1.87147111 -1.005269537    
4 5.692526217 2.307473783 1.239470428    
5 11.85193887 1.148061132 0.616686453    
6 5.904354728 0.595645272 0.319953668    




SUMMARY OUTPUT (ANALYSIS 10: Cost = βo + β1 (MTOW) + β2 (Thrust)) 
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.911543265      
R Square 0.830911123      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.746366685      
Standard Error 1.950264984      
Observations 7      
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 2 74.7630088 37.3815044 9.82809914 0.028591048  
Residual 4 15.2141340 3.80353350    
Total 6 89.9771428        
       
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 2.416558899 1.16966610 2.06602456 0.10771427 -0.830954826 5.6640726 
MTOW (kg) 0.002827762 0.00110976 2.54807487 0.06343482 -0.000253437 0.0059089 
Thrust (kW) -0.004489341 0.00608618 -0.7376276 0.50167153 -0.021387312 0.0124086 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       
       
Observation 
Predicted Cost 
USD (million) Residuals 
Standard 
Residuals    
1 5.029709628 -1.82970963 -1.14903744    
2 3.895712478 1.60428752 1.00747484    
3 8.473576476 -0.47357648 -0.2974008    
4 6.213757347 1.78624265 1.12174065    
5 13.37691606 -0.37691606 -0.23669912    
6 5.199375358 1.30062464 0.81677791    
7 2.910952657 -2.01095266 -1.26285606    




SUMMARY OUTPUT  
(ANALYSIS 11: Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (Endurance) + β3 (MTOW)) 
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.966270057      
R Square 0.933677822      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.908807006      
Standard 
Error 2.957363313      
Observations 12      
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 3 985.0031408 328.334380 37.5411004 4.6333E-05  
Residual 8 69.9679821 8.74599776    
Total 11 1054.971123        
       
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 1.720485306 1.501464767 1.14587124 0.28496618 -1.741898653 5.18286926 
Payload (kg) -0.004057438 0.008665961 -0.46820407 0.65213005 -0.024041179 0.01592630 
MTOW (kg) 0.002611859 0.000735181 3.55267373 0.00748020 0.000916528 0.00430719 
Endurance 
(hrs) 0.055147749 0.081038595 0.68051215 0.51538835 -0.131727586 0.24202308 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       




(million) Residuals     
1 4.857456231 -1.657456231     
2 4.053361271 1.446638729     
3 10.69207646 -2.692076459     
4 6.701448283 1.298551717     
5 13.80192546 -0.801925461     
6 5.78508103 0.71491897     
7 8.609381252 1.390618748     
8 36.39919095 -1.399190947     
9 11.92680752 6.573192475     
10 2.393702324 -1.493702324     
11 1.75956603 -1.69456603     
12 2.185003188 -1.685003188     
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SUMMARY OUTPUT  
(ANALYSIS 12: Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (Endurance) +  β3 (Thrust)) 
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.877778722      
R Square 0.770495484      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.540990968      
Standard Error 2.623620947      
Observations 7      
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 3 69.32698223 23.10899408 3.3572127 0.173221889  
Residual 3 20.65016062 6.883386874    
Total 6 89.97714286        
       
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 1.258552719 2.20304486 0.571278752 0.6078040 -5.752519257 8.26962469 
Payload (kg) 0.0011002 0.007592656 0.144903149 0.8939748 -0.02306302 0.02526341 
Endurance 
(hrs) 0.092882546 0.10025325 0.926479155 0.4225332 -0.226168039 0.41193313 
Thrust (kW) 0.007435541 0.004812585 1.545020212 0.2200511 -0.007880252 0.02275133 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       
       
Observation 
Predicted Cost 
USD (million) Residuals 
Standard 
Residuals    
1 6.000736963 -2.80073696 -1.509684622    
2 4.107034437 1.392965563 0.750851907    
3 9.638351942 -1.63835194 -0.883122823    
4 5.588488356 2.411511644 1.299880029    
5 12.07204177 0.927958235 0.500198446    
6 5.791699013 0.708300987 0.381796335    




SUMMARY OUTPUT  
(ANALYSIS 13: Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (MTOW) + β3 (Thrust)) 
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.926454182      
R Square 0.858317351      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.716634702      
Standard 
Error 2.061407281      
Observations 7      
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 3 77.2289429 25.7429809 6.0580272 0.086585144  
Residual 3 12.7481999 4.24939997    
Total 6 89.97714286        
       
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 2.626918697 1.26678771 2.07368501 0.1297837 -1.40456518 6.6584025 
Payload (kg) -0.006049838 0.00794176 -0.76177537 0.5016066 -0.031324064 0.0192243 
MTOW (kg) 0.004511972 0.00250280 1.80276647 0.1692106 -0.003453069 0.0124770 
Thrust (kW) -0.009363376 0.00907312 -1.03199028 0.3779847 -0.038238108 0.0195113 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       






Residuals    
1 3.973914666 -0.77391466 -0.53093856    
2 3.475615537 2.02438446 1.38881436    
3 8.924847712 -0.92484771 -0.63448508    
4 7.092939512 0.90706048 0.62228229    
5 13.07030608 -0.07030608 -0.04823297    
6 5.394102142 1.10589785 0.75869323    
7 3.16827435 -2.26827435 -1.55613322    
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SUMMARY OUTPUT  
(ANALYSIS 14: Cost = βo + β1 (Endurance) + β2 (MTOW) + β3 (Thrust)) 
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.912114789      
R Square 0.831953388      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.663906775      
Standard Error 2.245020717      
Observations 7      
       
ANOVA       
  Df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 3 74.8567888 24.9522629 4.9507298 0.110862774  
Residual 3 15.1203540 5.04011801    
Total 6 89.9771428        
       
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 2.206554254 2.04527083 1.07885675 0.3596630 -4.302410349 8.71551885 
Endurance 
(hrs) 0.01373554 0.10069572 0.13640638 0.9001392 -0.306723205 0.33419428 
MTOW (kg) 0.002550079 0.00240334 1.06105327 0.3665193 -0.005098443 0.01019860 
Thrust (kW) -0.003328157 0.01102498 -0.3018741 0.7824651 -0.038414576 0.03175826 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       
       
Observation 
Predicted Cost 
USD (million) Residuals 
Standard 
Residuals    
1 5.165102533 -1.96510253 -1.23788375    
2 3.820863818 1.67913618 1.05774398    
3 8.590843207 -0.59084320 -0.37219188    
4 6.196664613 1.80333538 1.13598121    
5 13.2736554 -0.27365539 -0.17238468    
6 5.31810727 1.18189273 0.74451372    




SUMMARY OUTPUT  
(ANALYSIS 15: Cost = βo + β1 (Payload) + β2 (Endurance) + β3 (MTOW) + β4 (Thrust)) 
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.928077321      
R Square 0.861327514      
Adjusted R 
Square 0.583982543      
Standard Error 2.497734378      
Observations 7      
       
ANOVA       
  Df SS MS F 
Significance 
F  
Regression 4 77.49978881 19.3749472 3.1056179 0.258114913  
Residual 2 12.47735405 6.23867702    
Total 6 89.97714286        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 2.2761945 2.278013414 0.99920153 0.4229571 -7.525306132 12.0776951 
Payload (kg) -0.006319792 0.00970958 -0.6508821 0.5819121 -0.048096743 0.03545715 
Endurance (hrs) 0.023553368 0.113041563 0.20836024 0.8542405 -0.462825221 0.50993195 
MTOW (kg) 0.00411096 0.003591732 1.14456209 0.3708939 -0.011343015 0.01956493 
Thrust (kW) -0.007589694 0.013904059 -0.54586176 0.6399100 -0.06741403 0.05223464 
       
       
       
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT       
       
Observation 
Predicted Cost 
USD (million) Residuals 
Standard 
Residuals    
1 4.15897169 -0.95897169 -0.66499773    
2 3.328521432 2.171478568 1.50580912    
3 9.146070336 -1.146070336 -0.79474105    
4 7.102859949 0.897140051 0.62212065    
5 12.87955577 0.120444233 0.08352190    
6 5.606389764 0.893610236 0.61967291    
7 2.877631063 -1.977631063 -1.37138581    
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